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Abstract  Socrates’  purposes,   in  his  philosophical  conversations  with  others,   remain a puzzle. 
We review eleven distinct interpretive options, many of which stretch back more than a hundred 
years, finding all of them untenable.  We then propose an original, twelfth interpretation as the 
most faithful and charitable alternative.  Our discussion   takes   as   its   focus   Plato’s   dialogue  





How   to   interpret   Socrates’   purpose   in   his   philosophical   conversations   with  
others has remained a puzzling question that has persisted to this day, with a variety of 
approaches on offer, none of which has achieved consensus, though some hold more 
currency than others. In what follows, we investigate eleven distinct interpretive 
options, many of which stretch back more than a hundred years. We critique these 
interpretations, making clear that whatever insight and value they may have for a 
reading of Socrates and Plato, they are ultimately untenable. We then offer a novel, 
twelfth interpretation as the only plausible alternative.1  
In the course of   analysis  we  have   chosen   to   focus   on  Plato’s   dialogue  Laches 
because it serves perfectly as a test case for reading a Socratic dialogue, and most of the 
issues raised here can be extrapolated from the present, more narrow, focus to a wider 
scope that includes without question all the aporetic dialogues and perhaps every 
dialogue in which Socrates is the principal figure. We aim to show that in interpreting 
Socrates one need not impose hidden meanings, esoteric clues, implicit messages, 
anachronistic ideologies or subversive intentions upon the Platonic dialogues in order to 
unlock   their   ‘true’  meaning   but   rather   should   note   Socrates’   own   explicit   words   and  
                                                 
1 Our interpretation has been anticipated only by Rudebusch, Socrates (Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009) but that proposal, in a book aimed at non-specialists, did not make a 
comparative assessment of the alternative interpretations. 
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 intentions as Plato has presented them to us and trace them at work in his own practice 
in conversation with others. The figure of Socrates that emerges accords with his own 
self-presentation within the Platonic dialogues and with his avowed intention to save 
himself and others through a lived practice of cross-examining the claims to knowledge 
of purported  ‘experts’. As should become clear, this concerns much more than simply 
refuting the vain pretensions of the conceited and powerful; it has to do rather with 
saving ourselves and others from the unwitting guilt that characterizes our condition of 
ignorance, a guilt that if not checked threatens to destroy us, our loved ones, and our 
communities, despite our best intentions and loftiest hopes. 
The Laches is a dialogue about courage. Two fathers, Lysimachus and Melisias, 
approach two Athenian generals, Laches and Nicias, for advice: should they enroll their 
sons in a fancy martial arts class? The two generals give conflicting advice, and the 
fathers turn to Socrates   to   cast   the   ‘deciding   vote’. Though Socrates is the junior 
member of the group, Laches has seen him display conspicuous courage in battle, and 
Nicias has heard good advice from Socrates in finding a teacher for his own son. They 
agree to grant their junior the privilege of speaking freely among them. 
But Socrates is reluctant to advise. Instead, he proposes that the would-be 
advisers demonstrate their mastery of the subject — how to raise excellent sons — by 
giving an account of the part of human excellence that is in question, namely, courage. 
Laches goes first, defining courage as standing  one’s  ground, then as endurance of the 
soul and finally as wise endurance of the soul. Socrates finds counter-examples to the 
first definition, giving examples of courage in flight. And Laches is quick to admit that 
foolish endurance cannot be a human excellence. Finally, Laches is perplexed when 
Socrates proceeds to give numerous examples of wise endurance that are not courage, 
and of foolish endurance that are courage.  
At this point, Nicias enters with his proposal. Instead of wise endurance he 
proposes wisdom alone as definition. And, unlike Laches, he is able to identify the 
specific wisdom that is courage, namely knowledge of what is fearful (i.e. future evils) 
and what is hopeful (future goods). However, Socrates, after eliciting a few undeniable 
premises, shows that such a definition would make courage the same as the whole of 
virtue — yet all have agreed that courage is merely one virtue among others, such as 
reverence, soundness of mind, and righteousness. Thus Nicias, too, is perplexed, which 
leads   to  Socrates’  concluding  advice   that  all  must  go  back   to  school. Had Laches and 
Nicias   heeded   Socrates’   advice   they  might   not   have  met   with   catastrophic   defeat   on  
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 their military campaigns in the decade that followed. The manner in which they lost, the 
bad decisions they made at crucial moments, is foreshadowed with dramatic irony by 
Plato in the dialogue.2 We are meant to notice that turning away from and not taking up 
the philosophical life Socrates shares with us leaves us open, in our ignorance, to 
making colossal blunders, in which despite our intentions we are responsible for our 
own destruction. Indeed in cases like the one under discussion, nothing less than the 
survival  of  one’s  own  community  is  at  stake. 
Taken at face value, the dialogue, after a lengthy dramatic prelude, is an 
investigation into ethical theory, searching for a definition of a human virtue. In what 
follows, we call this the Ethical Theory Interpretation. In modern times, this 
interpretation originated in Germany in the 1800s. Such an interpretation sees the 
dialogue’s   final   perplexity   as   inviting   a   solution   by   the   reader.   The   Ethical   Theory  
Interpretation remains the standard interpretation, outside of Germany, to the present 
day, although none of the alternatives within it has gained dominance. But there are at 
least nine additional alternatives to the Ethical Theory Interpretation as a whole, nearly 
all of which were first proposed in Germany, and each of which we will consider in 
turn. 
Paul Natorp proposed what we call a Theory of Knowledge Interpretation: the 
search in the dialogues is not for an account of virtue but for an account of knowledge 
itself.3 Where we seem to have the former it is only ever in service to and aiming at the 
latter. In view of the impossibility of reaching a resolution to the competing ethical 
theories, Max Hiestand proposed a Fruitlessness Interpretation.4 The final perplexity is 
not an invitation to the reader to provide a definition of courage, but a sign of the 
impossibility  of  knowledge  of  virtue.  One  might   think  here  of  Clitophon’s   lament   (at  
408d-e) and the influence of Socrates upon ancient Skepticism. George Grote provided 
                                                 
2 A   comparison   of   the   generals’   respective   deaths,   as   depicted   by   Thucydides,   with   certain 
features of their definitions in the dialogue (namely, the claim that the man who in battle 
endures wisely holding a superior position is less courageous than his opponent, at 193a, for 
Laches; the claim that it is not proper for the general to take orders from the seer, at 198e, for 
Nicias)  illuminates  the  connection  Plato  would  like  to  draw  between  an  interlocutor’s  refusal  to  
take   their   ignorance   seriously,   to   take   up   the   philosophical   life   and   grapple   with   one’s  
ignorance, and the destructive consequences of continuing to act as though one knew what one 
was doing.  
3 Paul Natorp, Platos Ideenlehre: Eine Einführung in den Idealismus (Leipzig: F. Meiner, 
1903). 
4 M. Hiestand, Das sokratische Nichtwissen in Platons ersten Dialogen (Zürich: 1923). 
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 yet another interpretation of the negative ending of Socratic dialogues: the goal is the 
creation and furtherance of individual, self-thinking minds, which we consider as a 
version of the Fruitlessness Interpretation and call the Think for Yourself Alternative, 
tracing it back to Hegel.5 We next consider several interpretations that view the central 
concerns of the dialogues as non-theoretical or praxis-oriented. As an alternative to all 
interpretations seeking (or skeptically denying) a theoretical solution to the final 
perplexity, Paul Friedländer 1928 proposed an Ineffable Knowledge Interpretation: the 
dialogue is not searching for a theory but showing us a non-theoretical know-how, in 
the character of Socrates, who exemplifies everyday civic virtue.6 On this account the 
perplexity in which the dialogue ends is his method of training students. Kurt 
Hildebrandt proposed a more radical non-theoretical alternative, a Will to Power 
Interpretation: Socrates aims in the dialogues to identify and inspire a master class who 
in great deeds of self-assertion will create and lead a new society.7 As with the Think for 
Yourself Interpretation such a view anachronistically imposes a contemporary ideology 
upon its ancient text, though unlike in the former case here Socrates is perversely given 
an intention more fitting for his sophistical arch-enemies, Callicles and Thrasymachus. 
More plausibly, Pierre Hadot and Michel Foucault view the figure of Socrates in the 
dialogues as a model for the philosophical way of life with which Plato aims to inspire 
us, while Francisco J. Gonzalez views him as displaying a courageous form of knowing 
ignorance.8 After the Second World War, Hans Krämer,9 Konrad Gaiser,10 and Michael 
Erler11 proposed interpretations of the Laches based  upon  Plato’s  Unwritten Doctrines. 
                                                 
5 G. Grote, Plato and the other companions of Sokrates, vol. 1 (London: John Murray, 1865). 
Page references to 2nd edition, London, 1885.  G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die philosophie 
der Geschichte, 3rd edition (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1848). 
6 P. Friedländer, Platon, vol. 1 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1928). Page references to 3rd 
edition, Berlin, 1964. 
7 K. Hildebrandt, Platon: Der Kampf des Geistes um die Macht (Berlin: G. Bondi, 1933). 
8 P. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault (Malden, 
MA: Blackwell, 1995). M. Foucault, The Courage of Truth: The Government of Self and Others 
II. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1983-1984 (New York: Picador, 2012). F. J. Gonzalez, 
Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato's Practice of Philosophical Inquiry (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1998). 
9 H. J. Krämer, Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles. Zum Wesen und zur Geschichte der 
platonischen Ontologie  (Heidelberg: 1959). 
10 K. Gaiser, Protreptik und Paränese bei Platon. Untersuchungen zur Form des platonischen 
Dialogs (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1959). 
11 M. Erler, Der Sinn der Aporien in den Dialogen Platons (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1987). 
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 These are a small set of metaphysical principles — about posits such as the One, the 
Many, the Bound, and the Boundless — that can be reconstructed from reports of 
Aristotle and others. According to this school of interpretation, Plato wrote the Laches 
to attract talented students to his academy, putting hints in it to remind insiders of his 
oral teachings. According to this interpretive alternative, Socrates is a metaphysician 
leading students to Platonic Forms.  
Ethical Theory Interpretations 
 
Ethical theory interpretations agree in supposing that Socrates aims to develop 
an ethical theory in his conversation with Laches and Nicias. Some see Socrates as 
aiming to teach an ethical theory, in which case he already has one that he wishes to 
impart, while others see Socrates as aiming to search for an ethical theory, in which 
case he enlists the two generals, supposed experts in the matter at hand, in the hopes of 
discovering the nature of courage. In either case, all such interpretations agree that 
Plato, in writing the dialogue, has given us a theory of courage in the dialogue. The 
theory is implicit because, of course, the dialogue explicitly ends in perplexity.  
Unfortunately, proponents have reached no consensus, nor even established a 
dominant account, of what the ethical theory is. At the beginning of modern 
interpretation of Platonic dialogues, within a decade of each other, German scholars 
presented two alternatives. Karl Steinhart proposed to define courage as a combination 
of the insights of Laches and Nicias: the part of virtue that is a kind of endurance of soul 
combined with knowledge of what is good and bad for human beings.12 We will refer to 
this as the Wise Endurance Alternative. Franz Susemihl,13 in contrast, proposed that 
courage is not a mere part but the whole of virtue, so that the words courage, soundness 
of mind, righteousness, reverence, and wisdom all refer to one and the same thing, 
namely knowledge of what is good and bad for human beings. We will call this the 
Knowledge Alone Alternative. 
Socrates refutes each of the definitions that Laches and Nicias propose. These 
definitions, taken one by one, are each deficient. Yet, according to the Wise Endurance 
Alternative, the dialogue is artfully constructed so that the reader is able to construct the 
                                                 
12 K. Steinhart, Platons saemmtliche Werke, vol. 1 (Leipzig: 1850). 
13 F. Susemihl, Die genetische Entwickelung der Platonischen Philosophie Part 1 (Leipzig: B.G. 
Tuebner, 1855). 
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 full and true definition of courage by combining the individual elements proposed 
within the dialogue, in particular those elements of his interlocutors’   definitions   that  
Socrates does appear to endorse, even if he refutes their arguments as wholes. As 
Steinhart (1850: 354) puts  it,  “all  aspects  of  the  concept  they  seek  are  explicitly  stated  in  
the course of the investigation, just as it stands, and [Plato] believed he could leave for 
the reader [to supply] only the last word of the analysis that sums it all up (das letzte 
Wort der zusammenfassenden Betrachtung).” 
Steinhart distinguishes three elements. Laches provides the non-cognitive 
element, endurance of the soul. Nicias provides the cognitive element, knowledge of 
what is to be dreaded and dared — that is, future good and bad things. Socrates finally 
extends the object of that knowledge to what is good and bad without reference to time. 
The definition assembled from these three elements makes courage a proper part of 
virtue as a whole. This result validates the part/whole thesis about the relation of 
courage to virtue, a thesis affirmed at the beginning of the examination of Laches and 
again at the beginning of the examination of Nicias. Courage on this account is, like all 
virtue, a kind of knowledge, but is distinctive in both the futural tendency of its 
cognition,  that  is,  its  ‘immediate  object’,  and  in  its  non-cognitive  component  or  ‘form’,  
endurance. Extrapolating from this, one might speculate that the other parts of virtue 
could then presumably be distinguished by either the temporal tendency of their 
cognition or their specific non-cognitive components. Thus Steinhart (1850: 354): 
“Courage   is   different from [the other] virtues both in its immediate object and in its 
form. For its nearest object is either a future good for us, that we attain by courageous 
battle, or a future evil that we wish to avoid through steadfast endurance [ . . . ] In form, 
moreover, courage shows itself as sound-minded steadfastness (besonnene Stand-
haftigkeit), as unwavering persistence at that which reason has recognized as good and 
right.”  Bonitz (1886: 215) and Von Arnim (1914: 26-29) also endorse this position.14 
The Wise Endurance Alternative of the Ethical Theory Interpretation finds 
defenders to the present day. For illustration, we will next consider merely two such 
proponents, Darrell Dobbs and Aristide Tessitore.15 Dobbs claims that, "The dialogue as 
                                                 
14 H. Bonitz, Platonische Studien (Berlin: 1886), 3rd edition. Hans von Arnim, Platos Jugend-
dialoge und die Entstehungszeit des Phaidros  (Leipzig: B.G. Tuebner, 1914). 
15 D.   Dobbs,   “For   Lack   of  Wisdom:   Courage   and   Inquiry   in   Plato's   Laches”, in Journal of 
Politics 48 (1986), 825-850.   A.   Tessitore,   “Courage   and   Comedy   in   Plato's   Laches”, in The 
Journal of Politics 56 (1994), 115-133. Similar proponents are Robert   Hoerber,   “Plato's  
Laches”, in: Classical Philology 63 (1968), 95-105; Erazim Kohak,  “The  Road  to  Wisdom”, in 
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 a whole...reveals courage itself as a firmness or perseverance resisting the terrors of the 
unknown" (1986: 826). Laches has this courage, Dobbs maintains, while Nicias displays 
for us how the desire for certainty precludes courage by paralyzing our judgment (1986: 
848). In the  first  place,  Dobbs  does  not  explain  how  Socrates’  endorsement  of  Nicias’  
claim,  which  is  in  fact  the  former’s  own,  that  “every  man  is  good  in  that  wherein  he  is  
wise,   and   bad   in   that  wherein   he   is   unlearned”   (194d)  would   not   also   be   open   to   his  
objection. Next, Dobbs seems to have misrepresented the episteme that Nicias speaks 
of. Is Nicias' proposed knowledge really a scientific expertise or might it not instead be 
similar to a practical or professional knowledge, the highest form attainable in a given 
time, grounds for belief and action but not certainty? One might also note that, at least 
to some extent, the fear of the unknown might be said to spur the advancement of useful 
knowledge. To persist in ignorance is no virtue.  
The contrast between the two principal interlocutors is meant to illustrate two 
conflicting ways of dealing with uncertainty. Dobbs holds Laches up as an example of 
courage for acknowledging his aporia, while faulting Nicias for not admitting aporia 
since he is afraid of the unknown (1986: 848). Yet Laches does not, properly speaking, 
acknowledge his aporia. While Laches does admit that he is perplexed, he claims his 
perplexity to result from the fact that he cannot rightly say what he is already sure he 
knows. If Laches acknowledged his aporia, he would admit that he does not know what 
courage is. Instead, he blames his inability to speak his thoughts well enough. Surely, 
we  are  meant   to   remember   here  Laches’   earlier   remarks   on   being   both   a   lover   and   a  
hater of speech, as his own excuse entails that, since his words are out of tune with his 
deeds, he must be despicable in his own eyes. He suffers a form of poetic justice at his 
own hands and with the help of Socrates.  
Tessitore 1994 suggests that the discussions with Laches and Nicias reveal 
Socrates as an example of the courage sought in the dialogue (122). Socrates has the 
kind of battlefield endurance Laches recommends, and the skill in argument and seeking 
of knowledge that Nicias values. Socrates is the hero of the dialogue who provides a 
model of the harmony of word and deed that Laches praises at the outset of their search 
                                                                                                                                               
Classical Journal 56 (1960), 123-132; Michael O'Brien,  “The  Unity  of  the  Laches”, in Essays in 
Ancient Greek Philosophy. Ed. by J. P. Anton and G. L. Kustas (Albany: SUNY Press, 1971), 
303-315;;  and  Daniel  Devereux  in  both  “Courage and  Wisdom  in  Plato's  Laches”,  in Journal of 
the History of Philosophy 15 (1977), 129-141,   and   “The   Unity   of   the   Virtues   in   Plato's  
Protagoras and Laches”, in The Philosophical Review 101 (1992), 765-789. 
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 for a suitable definition of courage.16 There are two objections to this: on the one hand, 
a single example, tinged with the contingent and particular features of its situation, is 
hardly a sound basis for an ethical theory, and on the other hand, Laches praised those 
speakers whose words accord with their deeds. Socrates for all his merits claims to be 
just as perplexed as the others and has shared in their failure to properly define courage. 
Like Laches and Nicias, he may have acted bravely in the past and may even display a 
kind of courage in deed during the conversation (as at 194a), but also like them he is not 
able to harmonize his words with such deeds. His explicit acknowledgement of his own 
shortcomings and suggestion that all, including him, seek a teacher, argues against our 
attributing to him the virtue of courage.  
The Knowledge Alone Alternative agrees with the Wise Endurance Alternative 
in seeing Socrates as aiming to develop an ethical theory in the course of the dialogue. It 
also  agrees  with  Steinhart’s  reading,  cited  above,  that  every  aspect  of  the  concept  to  be  
defined, courage, is stated at some point in the course of the dialogue, and all we as 
readers need to do is put it together. It disagrees in that it finds a different virtue theory. 
Instead of finding a definition of courage as wise endurance, it finds courage defined as 
knowledge of what is good and bad for human beings, all things considered. 
Thus Susemihl (1855: 35) asked   “whether   [ . . . ] the point of the dialogue, 
through an analysis of the concept of courage, is to reduce it to the concept of virtue in 
general [ . . . ] thus in general to present the differences between the particular virtues as 
inessential and especially to refute the usual notion of distinct virtues existing side by 
side (getrennt neben einander bestehenden Tugenden).”  He  answers  the  question  in  the  
affirmative a few pages later (likewise his 1855: 39 and Eduard Zeller [1859: 376 n. 
3]17). Interpreters continue to defend the Knowledge Alone Alternative to the present 
day.18  
                                                 
16 Similar proponents are Chris Emlyn-Jones,   “Dramatic   Structure   and   Cultural Context in 
Plato's  Laches”, in Classical Quarterly 49  (1999):  129  and  Richard  Foley,  “The  Better  Part  of  
Valor: The  Role  of  Wisdom  in  Plato’s  Laches, in History of Philosophy Quarterly 26 (2009): 
229-230. 
17 E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen volume II part 1, 2nd edition (Tübingen: 1859). 
18 After Santas (in “The  Socratic  Paradoxes”.  Philosophical Review 73 [1964]:147–64. Revised 
version in Santas 1979) defended the philosophical viability of the Knowledge Alone 
Alternative, Gregory Vlastos (in “The   Unity   of   Virtues   in   the   Protagoras.” Review of 
Metaphysics 25 [1972], 415-458. Reprinted in Vlastos 1981) interpreted Socrates as reducing 
virtue to many branches of knowledge, while Terry Penner (in “The   Unity   of   Virtue”.  
Philosophical Review 82 [1973], 35-68. Reprinted in Benson 1992) to only one. See Rudebusch, 
“Socrates,   Wisdom,   and   Pedagogy,”   Socratic, Platonic and Aristotelian Studies: Essays in 
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 As Bettina Fröhlich (2007:128) points out, the inconclusive dispute between the 
two  alternative  ethical  theory  interpretations  is  evidence  that  “both  positions  are  in  the  
end  problematic.”19 And if they are problematic, which the scholarly impasse suggests, 
this is already reason to view with suspicion the notion that Plato intended readers to 
simply put what was right in the definitions together and make explicit what he 
purposefully left implicit. We would not expect someone as intelligent and gifted a 
writer as Plato, if he intended to impart an ethical theory, to have left a gap between the 
implicit and explicit in the dialogue that centuries of scholarship has been unable to 
close. 
The great advantage of the Wise Endurance Alternative is that it is able to accept 
at  face  value  Socrates’  suggestion — indeed agreement —t hat courage is a proper part 
of virtue. This alternative distinguishes courage from the other virtues by means of the 
requirement that the non-cognitive character trait of endurance—in addition to 
appropriate cognition or knowledge — be part of the definition of courage. Yet such a 
requirement is the Achilles heel of this alternative. For the courage that is a human 
excellence is no more enduring in its nature than it is yielding. 
As Socrates points out to Laches, in some cavalry and chariot fighting men who 
do not stay in place and do run away while fighting are also brave (191a–b). Even if we 
restrict ourselves to the case of the fighting of armored foot soldiers, men who yield can 
be  as  brave  as  men  who  endure,  as   the  Spartans   famously  were  at  Plataea.  “They  say  
that the Spartans, up against troops with wicker shields, chose not to stand and fight 
them but to run away – and when the Persians broke ranks to pursue them, they turned 
upon  them  like  cavalry  and  by  fighting  this  way  won  the  battle”  (191b8–c5). The field 
of rescue work is another illustration that courage is no more enduring than yielding. 
The courageous rescuer — for example, a shepherd searching for a lost sheep — will 
endure in searching only so far as it is wise so to act. At some point, the risk to the rest 
of the flock or to the shepherd herself will require yielding to necessity, not enduring in 
the rescue. The bivalence of the non-cognitive trait of endurance is of course not 
restricted to the areas of infantry and rescue work, but generalizes to all spheres of 
human conduct, even academic scholarship. It often requires more courage of a scholar 
to abandon a position than to persist in its defense. 
                                                                                                                                               
Honor of Gerasimos Santas, ed. Georgios Anagnostopoulos. Springer Philosophical Studies 117 
(2011), 165-184, on these two varieties of the Knowledge Alone Alternative. 
19 Die sokratische Frage: Platons Laches (Berlin: Lit Verl., 2007). 
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 The century and a half of scholarly defense of the Wise Endurance Alternative 
has proved unable to solve this problem. Fröhlich (2007: 140) is right to say that such a 
definition  of  courage  “would  crumble  under  Socratic  examination,  if  [the  endurance  in  
question]  were  not  grounded  upon  appropriate  knowledge  of  the  good.”20 As it happens, 
some scholars do ground the endurance in question upon the appropriate knowledge of 
the good. Thus Devereux (1992: 783):   “Once   we   see   the   particular   way   in   which  
[Socrates] understands the power of knowledge [ . . . ] we can see that endurance is a 
necessary concomitant of knowledge of good  and  evil.”  The  endurance  Devereux  has  in  
mind — the  endurance  that  is  a  “necessary  concomitant  of  knowledge  of  good  and  evil” 
— will invariably endure not in a particular course of action but in tracking the human 
good, all things considered. The infantryman who wisely runs away endures in this 
sense. The rescue worker who wisely abandons the search endures in this sense. And 
the scholar who wisely gives up his position endures in this sense. But such endurance 
is common to other virtues. It is a necessary concomitant, for example, of soundness of 
mind, of righteousness, and of reverence to endure in tracking the human good. In 
general, as Devereux (1992: 783) says,  “the  Socratically  virtuous  person  has  endurance,  
or  what  we  might  call   ‘will  power’;;  but   this  power does not derive from the will, but 
[ . . . ] from  one’s  knowledge  of  the  good.”  Such  a  result  naturally  leads  us  to  consider  
the alternative Ethical Theory Interpretation, which defines courage in terms of 
knowledge alone. 
The great advantage of the Knowledge Alone Alternative is that it alone survives 
Socratic examination. Once we admit that we are investigating the courage that is a 
virtue — that is, a power that in any circumstances produces the human good — it turns 
out that only expertise at human well-being is this power. It is a consequence of this 
result that such expertise does not have proper parts, and hence that virtue does not have 
parts. On the contrary, virtue words — such as courage, soundness of mind, 
righteousness, reverence, and wisdom — all refer to one and the same power. Such a 
consequence is disastrous for the Ethical Theory Interpretation.  
The Ethical Theory Interpretation takes Socrates in his conversation with Laches 
and Nicias to aim at developing an ethical theory, namely, an account of courage. 
Socrates begins his conversation with Laches by forming an agreement that courage is a 
                                                 
20 This paper is in debt to Fröhlich for her critical review of the German alternative 
interpretations of the Laches. 
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 mere part of virtue, and he reiterates this agreement at the start of his conversation with 
Nicias. These agreements are hard enough to explain — we are driven to suppose that, 
somewhere in the course of the developing theory, Socrates rescinds this agreement. 
But, as Devereux (2006: 328-9) explains, such efforts are futile. According to the 
Knowledge  Alone  Alternative,  “the   final   argument  of   the  Laches is designed to show 
that courage is not a part of virtue, but rather is identical to the whole of virtue. 
However, the conclusion of the argument is hard to square with this view: Socrates says 
that since courage is a part and not the whole of virtue, we must reject the definition 
proposed by Nicias (199e3-11).”  If  Socrates  is  developing  an  ethical  theory  at  this,  the  
end of the dialogue, the premise that courage is a part and not the whole of virtue is 
certainly still a part of the developing theory. The futility of reconciling the Knowledge 
Alone Alternative with the Ethical Theory Interpretation should lead us to abandon or 
revise the project. There are two revisions at hand. 
Some interpreters try to avoid the problems facing the Wise Endurance and 
Knowledge Alone alternatives by proposing that Socrates, either wittingly or 
unwittingly, uses the word courage ambiguously in the Laches. Paul Woodruff attempts 
to reconcile the seeming contradiction between the statements that courage is only a part 
but also all of virtue.21 Woodruff distinguishes courage in essence (courage-itself) from 
courage in accident (courage-in-ingots, as it were, on the model of the distinction 
between the substance gold, which is all one, and gold-in-ingots, which has as many 
parts as there are ingots). According to this distinction, some things can be true of 
courage-in-ingots that are not true of courage-itself. For example, it may be that the 
predicate knowledge only of future goods and evils is true of courage-in-ingots but false 
of courage-itself.  
Unfortunately,  Woodruff’s   distinction   does   not   escape  Socrates’   argument.  To  
see  why,   let   us   accept  Woodruff’s   distinction   and  make  Woodruff’s   assumption   that  
when Socrates speaks of courage as a part of virtue, he is speaking of courage-in-ingots, 
not courage itself. Accordingly, courage-in-ingots is a part of virtue. Moreover, as 
Socrates and Nicias agree, this very courage-in-ingots will be nothing but the 
knowledge or science of future goods and evils. And it is undeniable, as Socrates and 
Laches rightly agree, that there is no distinction between the science that knows future 
                                                 
21 “Socrates   on   the   Parts   of   Virtue”, in: Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2 (Supplementary, 
1976): 101–116. 
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 goods and evils and the science that knows goods and evils past, present, and future 
(198d, 199a). Thus in whatever sense courage-in-ingots is the science of future goods 
and evils, it is precisely also the knowledge of all goods and evils, past, present, and 
future. It follows that courage-in-ingots is the whole of virtue, which contradicts 
Woodruff’s  interpretation.22 
Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith (2010: 157-166) find a different 
ambiguity.23 In the Laches, the words courage and virtue sometimes mean the power 
(dunamis) of courage or virtue, and sometimes mean the deeds (erga) of courage or 
virtue. On the one hand, the definition of the dunamis courage as knowledge of what is 
and is not to be feared (i.e. the knowledge of future goods and evils, i.e. the knowledge 
of good and evil, i.e. the dunamis virtue entire) is correct. And the proposition that the 
erga of courage are but a part of the erga of virtue entire is also correct. The thesis of 
Brickhouse and Smith is that, by means of this ambiguity, Socrates can reconcile the 
seemingly conflicting claims that courage is knowledge alone and is a proper part of 
virtue. 
Unfortunately,  the  ambiguity  fails  to  reconcile  Socrates’ claims. For Socrates is 
speaking unambiguously of courage as dunamis in both claims. As Brickhouse and 
Smith affirm, courage as dunamis is nothing but the knowledge of good and evil. But at 
190c, the star passage where Socrates secures agreement that courage is a proper part of 
virtue, Socrates is speaking first of sight, then of virtue, then of the whole of virtue, then 
of courage, in every case unambiguously as powers (dunameis).24 
                                                 
22 Rudebusch 2011  gives  this  criticism  of  Woodruff’s  alternative. 
23 Socratic Moral Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). For a similar 
ambiguity,   see   also   Michael   Ferejohn,   “The   Unity   of   Virtue   and   the Objects of Socratic 
Inquiry”, in Journal of the History of Philosophy 20 (1982), 1-21;;  and  “Socratic  Virtue  as  the  
Parts  of  Itself”.  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (1983-84), 377-88. Brickhouse 
and  Smith,  “Socrates  and the Unity of the Virtues”, in Journal of Ethics 1 (1997), 311-23; and 
C.C.W. Taylor, Socrates: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
67-68. 
24 There   is  a   red  herring   in  Brickhouse   and  Smith’s   exposition.  At   times   they   speak  as   if  not  
ambiguity but the singular nature of the relation between pure and applied science is the key to 
reconciling   the   conflicting   statements   about   the   ‘pure’   knowledge   of   good   and   evil   and   the  
‘applied’   knowledge   that   is   courage.   The   example   they   give   (2010:   164)   is   mathematical  
triangulation as opposed to navigational triangulation. “One   would   look   in   vain   for   any  
difference between them, as they both use precisely the same knowledge – the knowledge of 
triangulation.”   But   certainly   there   is   a   difference.   Navigational   triangulation   needs   to   know  
more than pure or mathematical triangulation: for example, it needs to know that stars are fixed 
points and that clouds are not. In general, any application of mathematical triangulation needs to 
know more than pure triangulation. Jörg Hardy, in Jenseits der Täuschungen—Selbsterkenntnis 
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 The above alternatives of the Ethical Theory Interpretation — Wise Endurance, 
Knowledge Alone, and Ambiguity — agree that, in the words of Steinhart (1850: 354), 
“all   aspects   of   the   concept   they   seek   are   explicitly   stated   in   the   course   of   the  
investigation,  just  as  it  stands.”  The  agreement  is  that  Socrates  completely  develops  all  
the pieces of the virtue theory, though the artful construction of the dialogue leaves it to 
the reader to assemble the pieces. The final alternative of the Ethical Theory 
Interpretation we consider is that the theory present in the dialogue is incomplete. 
For example, Max Pohlenz (1872: 29) holds that Socrates merely raises the 
question in the Laches “whether  courage  can  still  be  conceived  as a part of virtue as a 
whole (Gesamttugend) or is identical with it.”25 Likewise Rudolf Meister.26 Pohlenz and 
Meister both agree that, though the theory developed in the Laches is incomplete, it is 
possible   already   to   see   in   it   the   outlines   of   a   theory   completed   elsewhere   in   Plato’s  
writings. Unfortunately, just what theory Plato is already at work on but yet to finish 
and where to look for its further elaboration is unsettled. The disagreement between the 
Wise Endurance and the Knowledge Alone alternatives repeats itself among these 
interpreters. For Pohlenz, the completed theory is the reduction of all virtues to 
knowledge of the good, a reduction Pohlenz finds in the Protagoras. In contrast, 
Meister (1921: 108) sees the outlines of a different theory in the Laches, namely, the 
account of courage at Republic 430b as the power in the soul that unfailingly preserves 
right and lawful belief about what is and is not to be feared.  
The Incomplete Theory Alternative needs to provide an explanation why Plato 
would write such a dialogue. Perhaps it is a  “record  of  honest  perplexity”  (Vlastos  1954:  
353)27 or is a kind of advertisement  to  attend  Plato’s  Academy,28 or  has  a  “mnemonic  
                                                                                                                                               
und Selbstbestimmung mit Sokrates, Göttingen: V&R, 2011 (116-136), defends yet another 
ambiguity alternative. The ambiguity for him is that sometimes Socrates uses the word courage 
in an extensional sense (denoting the very same as the word virtue in this sense) and sometimes 
in an intensional sense (denoting a mere part of virtue). Hardy 2011: 128 deploys these terms 
(about   slightly   different   theses):   “The   statements   are   indeed   extensionally   equivalent,   but   not  
intensionally equivalent (extensional gleich, aber nicht intensional gleich).”  Hardy  2011:  124  
also speaks of courage as one thing having two aspects, depending upon which perspective it is 
seen  from.  “As  agents  (handelnde Personen) we perceive courage as the [ . . . ] wise endurance 
that Laches had in view. Nicias, on the other hand, appears to take a view of things that is 
detached  from  agency.” 
25 Aus Platos Werdezeit: Philologische Untersuchungen, Berlin: Weidmann, 1872. 
26 “Thema  und  Ergebnis  des  Platonischen  Laches”.  Wiener Studien 42 (1921), 103-114. 
27 “The  Third  Man Argument in the Parmenides” in:  Philosophical Review 63 (1954), 319- 
349. 
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 function”:  “a  memory  aid  for  those  coming  to  know”  (Erler  1987:  60),  or  any  number  of  
other possibilities. Why the insiders would bother to read these advertisements when 
they   could   already   have   the   ‘real   thing’   is   anybody’s   guess. One is reminded of 
Diogenes’  quip  to  Hegesias,  who  had  asked  the  former  for  one  of  his  writings,  “You  are  
a simpleton, Hegesias; you do not choose painted figs, but real ones; and yet you pass 
over   the   true   training   and  would   apply   yourself   to  written   rules”   (Diogenes   Laertius,  
Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 6.48).Consider, for instance, one more possibility, 
albeit an extreme one. One  might   even   take   Plato’s   disavowal of authenticity in the 
Seventh Epistle seriously and view his written corpus as playful, fictional sport, anti-
advertisements, perhaps even prototypical disinformation or black propaganda to keep 
those who have not been properly initiated and prepared for the true, oral teaching busy 
and preoccupied with something else, the way one gives children playful tasks in order 
to tire them out. In which case maybe only those who saw through the ruse and realized 
it was not serious might be suited for his esoteric teaching. This would make those of us 
who have studied and do seriously study it the butt of one of the most colossal swindles 
imaginable, were it not for the simple fact that, whatever Plato intended and whatever 
he may have thought of his own written work, it represents one of the pinnacles of 
philosophical thought within the Western tradition. Authors’   own   opinions   of   their  
work, and what they consciously intend thereby, are notoriously unreliable. Suppose 
Plato did consider his written work to be merely amusing trifles, not worthy of 
posterity. History has judged otherwise, and as with the work of Kafka, it deservedly 
has   had   the   last   word   even   if   against   the   author’s   own   explicit   intentions.   Such  
possibilities for why Plato would write dialogues in which an incomplete ethical theory 
is present lead to alternatives to the Ethical Theory Interpretation as a whole, rather than 
alternatives within that interpretation. 
Santas claims that prior to the discussion on courage, Socrates is established as 
"... an expert in a search for the nature of courage" (1971: 181). Socrates alone knows 
what to look for, namely, a definition that holds, and he also has a method for reaching 
such a definition, namely, asking the right questions, and posing counter-examples to 
test the consistency of hypotheses (1971: 183). In the end, Santas concludes, the 
dialogue succeeds in presenting us with almost all the right questions, but no 
                                                                                                                                               
28 As for example Gaiser 1959, Krämer 1959, and Charles Kahn, Plato and the Socratic 
Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998). 
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 satisfactory answers (1971: 208). Which is why, perhaps, it ends with a promise of 
continuing later, he notes. The only problem with this view is that the characters within 
the dialogue promise each other to continue their investigation later, but Plato, the 
author of the dialogue, has given us a complete, finished, and polished work that 
deliberately, as with other aporetic dialogues, ends in perplexity.  
The Theory of Knowledge Interpretation 
 
The Marburg Neokantians (such as Hermann Cohen 187829 and Natorp 1903) 
proposed a radical reinterpretation of the Laches. For Natorp (1921: 390) it  is  “as  plain 
as   day”   that   Plato   has   been   “completely   misunderstood.”30 All prior interpretations, 
from  Aristotle   onward,   fundamentally   misinterpret   Plato’s   work   as   a   whole,   because  
they  do  not   recognize  that  Plato’s  forms  are  Kantian  categories  of   thought.  The  virtue 
dialogues, investigating the nature of moral knowledge, set the stage. Thus about the 
Laches, Natorp (1921: 10) says,   “in   the   investigation,   penetrating   ever   deeper,   of   the  
concept of that knowledge in which, according to Socrates, virtue consists, we will see 
unfold,   step   by   step,   the   distinctive   Platonic   concept   of   knowledge.”   According   to  
Natorp (1903: 19), the Laches contains   a   correction,   “at   least   a   clarification”, of the 
account in the Protagoras. In the Protagoras (at 356b-e) moral knowledge is 
“calculation based upon measurement of the pleasant and unpleasant consequences of 
actions”, a   “felicitous   prediction   of   the   temporal,   empirical   consequences   of   our  
actions.”  But  in  the  Laches,  the  knowledge  that  is  virtue  is  a  “knowledge  of  a  good  that  
is one, that is at all times the same, that is immutable and independent of temporal 
distinctions”  (1903: 19).  “In  this  insight  lay  the  germ  of  an  idea”  (1903: 20)—namely, a 
principle  of  Plato’s  laws  of  thought  as  he  developed  them  in  other  dialogues. 
According to Natorp (1903: 20-21), in writing the Laches Plato was aware of an 
“inner  conflict”  in “the  two basic motives of the Socratic: on the one hand the ignorance 
of  virtue  and  inability  to  learn,  on  the  other  hand  virtue’s  unity  with  knowledge,  which 
demands   teachability.”  Natorp   (1903:   21) sees Plato solve this problem in the Meno, 
“which,  with   the   thesis  of  knowing  as   recollection—the most primitive version of the 
theory of forms, described in mythical terms—finally answered, and in doing so made 
                                                 
29 “Platons   Ideenlehre   und   die   Mathematik”.   Reprinted   in   Schriften zur Philosophie und 
Zeitgeschichte ed. by A. Görland and E. Cassirer, vol. 1, Berlin, 1928 (336-366). 
30 Platos Ideenlehre: Eine Einführung in den Idealismus, 2nd edition (Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1921). 
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 obsolete,  the  problem  of  teachability  that  completely  dominated  the  early  dialogues.”  If  
this were so, Natorp needs a better explanation as to why the Theaetetus, generally 
considered to come after the Meno, concerns the question of knowledge and ends 
aporetically and only refers, if at all, cryptically to recollection.31 Had Plato solved the 
Socratic tension between our being in, at best, a condition of self-aware ignorance and 
the need for knowledge in order to be virtuous one would have expected the insights of 
the Meno to be carried forward into the Theaetetus. 
Natorp (1903: 21) finds other evidence that the Laches is better interpreted as 
part of a search for a theory of knowledge than of ethics in  its  methodology,  which  “is  
continually drawn to definition.” 
It annoys the brave soldier Laches that he, asked what courage is, thinks he definitely 
has it in mind, but nonetheless does not know how to grasp it in words and say what it 
really is (194b) which in technical terms means to define (properly, delimit, 194c). The 
technical term is instructively explained by the example [of speed, in order to illustrate] 
what is needed to find a definition, what is the same in every case [ . . . ] , what identical 
basic nature runs through every instance (1903: 21). 
The dialogue’s   discussion   of   definition uncovers   the   “definite,   systematic  
opposition of the unity of the concept to the multiplicity of the cases, cases that are 
connected precisely through  that  unity  to  totality”  (1903:  21).  For  Natorp  (1903:  21), the 
evidence confirming his epistemological interpretation of the Laches is what he calls its 
“most   important   achievement   in   the   end:   the   unity   in   the   concept   of   established  
knowledge”   throughout   temporal   diversity:   “Socrates   shows   that   the   knowledge   in  
general of a thing is nothing different for past, present, and future, but is one and the 
same (198d)”, foreshadowing   “the   immutable   eternal”   as   the   proper   object   of  
knowledge  in  Plato’s  theory  of  forms.   
Natorp (1903: 22) takes this, the last positive result in the dialogue, to explain 
the  subsequent  perplexity,  with  which  the  dialogue  ends:  “it  was  far  more  important  at  
the time to note that the knowledge in which virtue as a whole consists is not the 
empirical knowledge of what once was, now is, or in future will be, especially not the 
knowledge [described at Protagoras 356b-e] of anticipated pleasant and unpleasant 
consequences; but rather to note that its object is always existent, at all times one and 
the  same:  the  eternal  Good.” 
                                                 
31 Timothy Chappell, in Reading   Plato’s  Theaetetus (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2004), plausibly 
argues against there being a reference to the Meno’s account of recollection in the midwifery 
passage of the Theaetetus (46-47). 
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 Natorp’s   interpretation   of   the  Laches is part of an overall account of Plato as 
developing from a Socratic to a proto-Kantian philosopher. Without calling into 
question   the   premises   Natorp   assembles   in   his   account,   we   point   out   that   Natorp’s  
explanation of the form of the Laches is deficient.   If   it   is   Socrates’   aim   within   the  
dialogue  (or  Plato’s  aim  in  writing  the  dialogue)  to  develop  a  theory  not  of  virtue  but  of  
knowledge, then we ought to expect the dialogue to end with its positive result about the 
universality of knowledge, rather than in perplexity about courage. As Fröhlich (2007: 
166) puts   the   objection:   “the   definition   of   knowledge,  which   should   be   the   goal   and  
result  of  the  discussion,  is  not  formulated  at  the  end  or  articulated”—allowing her to ask 
(2007: 166-7):   “Where   does   one find that Platonic knowledge of knowledge (Wissen 
von der Erkenntnis)   that   Natorp   stated   to   be   goal   and   result   of   the   dialogue?”   It   is  
implausible  that  Socrates’  premise  about  the  universality  of  knowledge  is  the  aim  of  the  
dialogue as a whole. That Plato was perfectly capable of writing a dialogue that does 
explicitly concern knowledge should be clear from the Theaetetus. Even were he to turn 




Hiestand (1923) has a simple and powerful argument against any interpretation 
that finds in the Laches the development of a theory, whether an ethical theory or a 
theory of knowledge: if the dialogue develops theoretical knowledge, then there must be 
progress towards that goal within the dialogue. But there is no such progress: the search 
in the dialogue is fruitless.  
Hiestand finds four substantive Socratic propositions in the Laches: 
1. Courage is a part of virtue. 
2. Courage is something good. 
3. Only wise endurance is good. 
4. Someone is good in that in which he is wise. 
Hiestand (1923: 38) notes that these four propositions are not proved and 
describes  them  as  “called  into  question  during  lengthy  discussions,  but  neither  rejected  
nor established as correct (als richtig anerkannt).”   He   thinks   that   the   contradictions  
between moral requirements and everyday experience remain unresolved in the 
dialogue, and that the perplexity at the end is real. He (1923: 38) describes the result of 
the dialogue as a whole: “military  leaders — experts, we ought to suppose — find no 
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 conclusive answer. Socrates himself does not know how to solve the contradiction. 
Therefore in both cases there is just one inescapable conclusion (unerbittliches 
Ergebnis) for all participants: the recognition  of  ignorance.”   
The   “often   expressed   result”   of   Socratic   examination   in   general   is   this  
“ignorance”  (1923: 88). Accordingly, Hiestand (1923: 41) finds in the virtue dialogues 
not   a   single   “clear   result   or   a   definite   step   in   the   direction”   of   a   result.   “Neither   for  
Socrates nor for the interlocutor is there in the course of the dialogues an intellectually 
positive   achievement”   (1923:   41).   Thus,   as Fröhlich (2007: 153) reports,   Hiestand’s  
Socrates was not trying to develop a definition at all, but rather   “wanted   to  bring   the  
interlocutor to that insight into ignorance or self-awareness that he himself had 
obtained. The Socratic question aims to unmask the educational and moral knowledge 
of the interlocutor as mere appearance (Scheinwissen) and thereby to free him from 
vanity  and  conceit  and  to  inculcate  humility.”  
That Socrates in the Laches aims to unmask ignorance, rather than develop any 
theoretical account of his own, is also endorsed by the Philosophical Interpretation (see 
below). What is distinctive   to   Hiestand’s Fruitlessness Interpretation are his further 
claims (1923: 98) that   for  Socrates  “moral  knowledge   is   impossible”  and   in  particular  
that   such   a   goal   is   “something   fruitless   and   empty”   (Unfruchtbares, Leeres). Thus 
Socrates presumes to unmask  our  phony  goals,  but  puts  “no  other  creative  deed  in  their  
place”, leaving  us  “therefore  only  the  bleak  insight  in  our  own  inability  (Unvermögen)”, 
with   the   result   that   “this   Socrates  must   become  weary;;   death   can   bring him nothing 
more  bitter”  (1923: 101). 
Hiestand’s   distinctive   claims   about   bitter   fruitlessness are, as Fröhlich (2007: 
157) points   out,   at   odds   with   Socrates’   “reflective   search   for   knowledge”   and   in  
particular his repeated exhortations to others to live lives of reflective philosophical 
examination. Other alternatives, accepting the point that the virtue dialogues do not 
develop theoretical accounts, seek to find something more positive than bitter 
fruitlessness. Furthermore,  Hiestand  has  overlooked  Socrates’  own  response  to  Laches’  
grappling  with   perplexity   after   the   latter’s   refutation (at 194a). Laches, as one might 
read him, can be seen to feel something of this bitter fruitlessness when he complains 
that though he feels he knows what courage is he cannot put it into words, cannot 
harmonize his logos with the courageous erga he has himself performed and seen 
others, such as Socrates, perform. If Socrates simply negated the pretensions of his 
interlocutors and left them with no alternative other than skepticism, why does he exhort 
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 Laches to continue in the search for knowledge of courage after refuting him? Why does 
he suggest a hypothetical, if only playful, definition of courage himself at this point? If 
the point was simply to lead others to a recognition of their own vanity we would expect 
him, according to the Fruitlessness Interpretation, simply to leave Laches alone at this 
point and move on to his next target, Nicias. 
A different version of the Fruitlessness Interpretation, in which the bitterness of 
arriving at insight into our ignorance is mitigated by emphasizing our negative capacity 
to critique customary beliefs in individual and novel ways, which we call the Think for 
Yourself Alternative, is found in Hegel and Grote. Here, since one cannot attain 
objective knowledge, since such an attempt is shown in the dialogues to be fruitless, the 
best one can hope for is the cultivation of the capacity of thinking for oneself. In other 
words, the barrenness of acquiring objective knowledge is mitigated by the fruitfulness 
of self-enrichment, the enhancement of subjectivity. Hegel (1848: 328) proposed  that  “it  
is in Socrates that [ . . . ] the principle of subjectivity (Innerlichkeit)—the absolute 
independence of thought in itself—attained freedom of expression. He taught that man 
has to find and recognize in himself what is the right and good, and that this right and 
good is in its nature universal. Socrates is famous as an ethics teacher, but he is, rather, 
the  inventor  of  ethics.”  Hegel’s  Socrates is, in the words of Frank M. Turner, “a  radical,  
self-conscious opponent of [ . . . ] the rule of custom, religion, emotion, and 
prescription, which Hegel had associated with Sittlichkeit”   (1984: 295),32 that is, 
conventional morality. Hegel does not provide specifics to develop the abstract proposal 
about  Socrates’  expression  of  subjectivity.   
Grote provides one way to   understand  Hegel’s   abstractly   stated interpretation. 
Like   Hegel,   Grote’s   Socrates   is   an   opponent   of   blind   acceptance   of   external  
prescriptions of behavior. Accordingly, Grote denies  that  “negative  dialogues”  such  as  
the Laches seek to develop theories. In some passages (e.g. 1885: 418) Grote seems to 
accept   the   bitter   fruitlessness   interpretation:   “this   then   is   the  mission   and  vocation   of  
Sokrates — 1. To cross-examine men, and to destroy that false persuasion of wisdom 
and virtue which is so widely diffused among them. 2. To reproach them, and make 
them ashamed of pursuing wealth and glory more than wisdom and virtue. But Sokrates 
is  not  empowered  to  do  more  for  them.”   
                                                 
32 The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). 
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 Grote (1885: 420) does   nonetheless   find   that   both   Socrates   and   Plato   “had  
affirmative doctrines and convictions, though not both the same. But the affirmative 
vein, with both of them, runs in a channel completely distinct from the negative. The 
affirmative theory has its roots aliunde, and is neither generated, nor adapted, with a 
view to reconcile the contradictions, or elucidate the obscurities, which the negative 
Elenchus  has  exposed.”  Accordingly  (1885:  421),  “The  negative  cross-examination, and 
the affirmative dogmatism, are (both in Sokrates and in Plato) two unconnected 
operations   of   thought:   the   one   does   not   lead   to,   or   involve,   or   verify,   the   other.”  But  
Grote (1885: 421) finds  Socrates’  positive  doctrines  in  such  places  as  the  “Xenophontic  
Memorabilia”, not the Laches. 
Despite his claim that Socrates cannot do more than destroy and reproach, in the 
case of negative dialogues like the Laches, Grote (1885: 421) attributes something more 
to  Socrates  than  bitter  fruitlessness,  namely,  “the  creation  and  furtherance of individual, 
self-thinking minds, each instigated to form some rational and consistent theory for 
itself.”  For  Grote  (1885:  421) this  result  “is  a  material  benefit,  even  though  no  further 
aid be rendered to the process except in the way of negative suggestion. 
That such minds should be made to feel the arbitrary and incoherent character of that 
which they have imbibed by passive association as ethics and aesthetics,—and that they 
should endeavour to test it by some rational and consistent standard—would be an 
improving process, though no one theory could be framed satisfactory to all. The 
Sokratic Elenchus went directly to this result.  
 
Subjectivity, that is, thinking   for   oneself,   even   if   one’s   thoughts   are  
unsatisfactory to some others, is  Socrates’  aim in the Laches. Such subjectivity is a very 
modest improvement upon bitter fruitlessness. Surely Socrates himself would deny that 
such thinking for oneself is a benefit for any human being. 
For every man who knows not how to make use of his soul it is better to have his soul at 
rest and not to live, than to live acting according to his own caprice; but if it is necessary 
for him to live, it is better after all for such a one to spend his life as a slave rather than a 
free man. 
 
This quotation is from a speech Socrates makes at Clitophon 408a–b, whose 
author   is   either   Plato   or   a   student   of   Plato   and  who   accurately   summarizes   Socrates’  
conclusions as Plato presents them at Euthydemus 278e–282c. According to Xenophon 
(Memorabilia 1.2.49–50), Socrates at trial was accused of arguing for the lawfulness 
and beneficence of the wiser imprisoning the more ignorant. Socrates values not 
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 subjectivity but wisdom. Thinking for oneself is irrelevant in and of itself; what matters 
is that one thinks the truth.  
Praxis Interpretations 
 
We next consider several interpretations that share a concern with emphasizing 
the non-theoretical display of virtue by Socrates in the dialogues, varieties of what we 
call the Praxis Interpretation. Whether the activity is one of ineffable insight, or a kind 
of knowing ignorance that is displayed by Socrates for the benefit of his interlocutors 
and for us as readers, or an entire way of life that one can adopt for oneself, each of 
these interpretations holds that Socratic philosophy is fundamentally a practice and not a 
theory, fundamentally a matter of attaining insights that cannot be reduced to formulae 
but are learned by imitating a model. One such version of the Praxis Interpretation, The 
Ineffable Knowledge Interpretation, like the Know Nothing and Think for Yourself 
interpretations, denies that the aim of a Socratic conversation like the Laches is to 
develop  a  theoretical  account  of  virtue  (or  knowledge).  Nonetheless  Socrates’  aim  there  
is the development of wisdom, a wisdom that is not the propositional knowledge of a 
theory. Instead it is a kind of knowledge that theoretical statements in important ways 
cannot capture.33  
The following reasoning seems to lead to this interpretation: 
1. There must be something more positive to be learned from Socratic dialogue 
than bitter fruitlessness!  
2. But there is evidently no progress in theoretical knowledge in a Socratic 
dialogue.  
3. Thus there must be progress in non-theoretical knowledge. 
According to Friedländer (1928: 44), “it  is  wrong  to  see  the  Laches simply as an 
investigation concerning the nature of courage, to see its issue as a definition that one 
might suppose is easy to formulate out of the basic approaches in that investigation. In 
contrast, the overall meaning of the slice of world which is pictured [in the Laches] is 
far more accurately characterized by the word education”  than  as  the  development  of  a  
                                                 
33 Proponents   include   Julius   Stenzel,   “Wissenschaft   und   Staatsgesinnung   bei   Platon”   (Kiel:  
Lipsius und Tischer,1927) and Platon der Erzieher (Leipzig: Meiner, 1928); Friedländer 1928, 
Werner   Jaeger,   “Die   platonische Philosophie als Paideia”, in Das Platonbild: Zehn Beitrage 
zum Platonverstandnis, ed. K. Gaiser (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1969); Wolfgang Wieland, Platon 
und die Formen des Wissens, 2nd and 3rd editions (Göttingen  :  Vandenhoeck  &  Ruprecht,  1982 
and 1999, respectively) and Fröhlich 2007. 
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 theory or as a theoretical investigation. For Friedländer (1928: 44) the   “theoretical  
investigation concerning courage”   is   just  a  part  of   the  “total   educational  process”— a 
process that leads not to a theory, nor to fruitlessness or subjectivity, but in the best case 
to a life of virtue, which is the examining life.34 
Non-propositional knowledge might be either practical know-how or it might be 
knowledge by acquaintance. Friedländer proposes that the goal of a Socratic dialogue is 
both. On the one hand — as to the goal being a kind of know-how — Friedländer (1928: 
64) describes  the  goal  of  Socrates’  activity  as  the  activity of that life itself, a life spent 
examining oneself and others.  
What Socrates asked was, to Plato, both question and answer; what Socrates lived was 
both his life and his teaching. Socrates asks: what is [courage]? He lets others see that 
they do not know. He seeks the answer in thought but he gives it at last in his life and 
death [ . . . ].   That   is   the   answer   to   Socrates’   question,   to   be   read   in   the   reality   that  
Socrates was.35  
 
The wisdom Socrates seeks, then, is a wisdom that he already possesses and 
exemplifies.   Friedländer   cannot   take   at   face   value   Socrates’   profession   of   ignorance.  
Instead  he  (1928:  162)  interprets  Socrates’  profession  of  ignorance  as  an  expression  of  
“the  impossibility  finally  to  say  (in Worten allerletzt zu sagen) what the righteous  is.”  It  
is this ineffability of wisdom that underlies the “knowledge   of   the   lived   life”   (1928:  
156), a life that Friedländer (1928: 162-3) describes  as  the  “being  of  the  righteous  man,  
which  raises  him  to  the  level  of  the  gods.”   
On the other hand — as to the goal of a dialogue being knowledge by 
acquaintance — Friedländer’s   interpretation   of   Socrates   is   connected   to   his  
interpretation of Plato, a Plato who has no theory of Forms but somehow still offers us a 
                                                 
34 Like the Philosophical Interpretation (defended below), Friedländer interprets Socrates 
intentionally to direct the discussion to a false start in every dialogue where he seeks to define a 
part of virtue. Fröhlich (2007: 182) criticizes such an interpretation by asking the rhetorical 
question:  “Has  Socrates  in  all  the  virtue  dialogues  intentionally  posed  a  false  question?”  Unlike  
the Philosophical Interpretation, Friedländer lacks the resources to explain why Socrates would 
do such a thing. 
35 One can object that Friedländer and others sharing this view shift the problem of 
interpretation from a textual/theoretical one to a lived and embodied/practical one. Since we 
allegedly get no clear answers to the theoretical questions, we are supposed to look to how 
Socrates lived and conducted himself (as providing the hidden 'answer'). Clearly, the Cynics did 
this. But, Socrates' life and conduct have themselves been the subject of various interpretations 
and emphases (Aristippus, Antisthenes and Plato would presumably all in some sense claim to 
be following the example of Socrates but they live and practice fundamentally different 
philosophical projects). Now, instead of arguing over Plato's/Socrates' theory in the dialogues 
we argue over what Socrates as living example signifies.  
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 vision of the Forms — that is, a knowledge by acquaintance. Through Socratic 
conversations  and   in   the  person  of  Socrates  himself,  Friedländer’s  Plato   sees  Courage  
Itself.  For  those  who  have  seen  the  Forms,  there  is  only  a  single  task:  “to  open  the  eyes  
of  others  to  what  you  have  seen”  (1928:  21).  “The  whole Platonic corpus is an effort to 
bring  us  “to  a  vision  of   the  Form   [der Idee] and   to  an  intimation  of   the  highest  good”  
(1928: 68) with the goal of reforming individual and state.  
Friedländer (1928: 57) unites the wisdom that is know-how and the wisdom that 
is knowledge by acquaintance in the following way. The knowledge by acquaintance or 
“vision”  of  the  Forms  cannot  be  expressed  in  the  words  of  a  theory  but  in  the  activity  of  
a life: living and knowing are  “linked  into  an  inseparable  unity.”36 
Any   such   interpretation   must   ignore   an   important   feature   of   Socrates’   craft  
analogy. It is true that we cannot present in a list of theoretical statements everything 
significant about the practical activity of the farmer, say, or the general. But, 
Euthyphro’s  inability  notwithstanding  (Euthyphro 13e-14b), we still expect an expert to 
be able to sum up what the goal of such activity is: food from the earth or victory in 
war. Likewise we are entitled to expect of a person with expert practical know-how 
about courage to give a competent account of what courage is. As Socrates repeatedly 
says (e.g. at Charmides 158e-159a) about human excellence, if you possess it, you 
ought to be able to say what it is. This unfaithfulness to the text is a defect of the 
Ineffable Interpretation. Were this interpretation correct, in the Laches we would expect 
Socrates  to  accept  Laches’  excuse  that  the  latter  cannot put into words his definition of 
courage,  though  he  still  believes  he  ‘knows’  what  it  is  (at  194b). Even more, we would 
expect  Socrates   to   say   to  Laches   something   like   “You’re  beginning   to  understand the 
point  of  what  we’re  doing!” The fact that Socrates does not accept  Laches’  excuse  and  
carries through his refutation argues against Friedländer's interpretation. Indeed, if 
Friedländer were right, then the theme of harmonizing one's words and deeds would not 
play the prominent role it does in the Laches. If wisdom is ultimately ineffable, then 
                                                 
36 Like  Friedländer,  Fröhlich  (2007:  157)  distinguishes  “theoretical  knowledge”  (theoretischem 
Wissen)  from  the  “ineffable  knowledge”  (kein aussagbares Wissen) that is the goal of a Socratic 
dialogue. Like Friedländer, she (2007: 269) sees that knowledge as both know-how (namely, 
“skill  at  examination”,  Prüfungskompetenz)  and  knowledge  by  acquaintance  (described  as  “non-
conceptual   insight”,   nicht-begriffliche Einsicht). Like Friedländer, she (2007: 270) sees 
“virtuous   being”   (tugendhaften Seins)   in   the   Socratic   act   of   “examining   and   seeking”:   “the  
course  of  the  dialogue  shows  that  Socrates  exercises  courage.”  And  like  Friedländer,  she  (2007:  
271) unites knowledge by acquaintance with know-how  in  action:  Socratic  dialogue  is  “a  unity 
of knowledge and life experience, of theory and praxis. The virtue discussed in dialogue is not 
merely  viewed  but  realized.”   
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 there would be no need to worry about whether one's deeds and words are in harmony, 
for virtue would not be able to be put into words. One would simply act virtuously 
without being able to give it utterance in speech. 
In  addition,  any  interpretation  that,  like  Friedländer’s  or  Fröhlich’s,  identifies the 
philosophical  life  with  a  virtuous  life  conflicts  with  Socrates’  account  in  the  Apology of 
three levels of wisdom. 
The  highest  level  is  “real  wisdom”  (23a5-6), which is the property of God, not human 
beings.  The  middle  level  is  being  “wisest  among  men”  (23b2),  which  is  the  property  of  
anyone  who,  like  Socrates,  “knows  that  he  does  not  possess  real  wisdom  of  any  value”  
(23b3-4).  The  lowest  level  is  “not  being  wise,  but  seeming  wise,  especially  to  oneself”  
(21c6-7). Socrates is as wise as a mortal can be — no one is wiser — because only God 
possesses wisdom and because Socrates is significantly wiser than people who are 
ignorant even of their ignorance (Rudebusch 2009: 20). 
 
Socrates knows that, being ignorant, he is unable to teach people virtue. This is 
why he refuses to accept payment for his time. Bringing people from the lowest level 
(which is bad) to the middle level (which is neither good nor bad) is the best he can do. 
Such an achievement is a significant gain — it removes the guilt of reckless, albeit 
unintentional, wrongdoing from our life.37 But Socrates neither teaches nor shows us 
how to be virtuous. A better interpretation will be more faithful to the text. 
Characteristic of the Praxis Interpretation is the view that the ultimate purpose of 
the dialogues is to model for us a philosophical way of life. Pierre Hadot gives another 
version of this interpretation. Based upon remarks of Plato in the Seventh Letter and the 
myth told in the Phaedrus,   Hadot   claims   that   Plato’s   written   dialogues   were   not 
intended   as   serious   philosophical  works   but   are   rather   “works   of   propaganda,   decked  
out with all the prestige of literary art but intended to convert   people   to   philosophy”  
(2002: 72).38 Like Gaiser 1959 and Krämer 1959, Hadot views the dialogues as 
advertisements for prospective philosophy candidates, as instruments of their 
conversion. Plato   chose   to   write   dialogues   because   the   Socratic   dialogue   was   “very  
fashionable  at   the   time”  and  because  such  a  dialogue,  with  Socrates  as  principal,  best  
displays what Hadot (2002: 72) calls the  “ethical  value  of  dialogue.”  In other words, the 
kind   of   discussion   that   Socrates   and   his   interlocutors   have   in   Plato’s   dialogues   is   a  
model for the lived practice of similar discussions that we as aspiring philosophers 
                                                 
37 It is thus a positive accomplishment in the sense of moving us from a worse condition of 
unwitting culpability into a better one  of  ‘doing  no  harm’. 
38 What is Ancient Philosophy? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. 
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 should have. The dead letter of the written dialogues captures something of the living 
spirit of oral discussion within the Academy and the reading of the former is supposed 
to spur us on to the lived practice of the latter. The  written   dialogues’   purpose   is   to  
improve  one’s  powers  of   reasoning,   so   that  a   student  can  “master   the  arts  of  measure  
and  definition  in  every  domain”  (2002:  73). There  are  elements  of  Plato’s  philosophical  
doctrine scattered throughout the dialogues but what is fundamental is that they train 
students to live ethically by inculcating the acceptance of values such as the importance 
of defining a form or idea in order for rational discussion to be possible, so that we are 
actually talking about the same thing with each other. Hadot also sees Plato’s  dialogues  
as  showing  “the  Norms…the  Forms,  or  Reason,  or  the  Good,  or  Beauty”  (2002:  75)  but  
not explicitly stating what they are.  
Hadot  sums  up  his  view  as   follows:  “There  was  a  Socratic  style  of   life   (which  
the Cynics were to imitate), and the Socratic dialogue was an exercise which brought 
Socrates’  interlocutor  to  put  himself  in  question,  to  take  care  of  himself,  and  to  make  his  
soul as beautiful and wise as possible. Similarly, Plato defined philosophy as a training 
for death, and the philosopher as the person who does not fear death, because he 
contemplates   the   totality   of   time   and   of   being”   (1995:   269). Philosophy,   on  Hadot’s  
account, is fundamentally something one does, a lived practice, an ethical comportment 
toward oneself, others and the world. Plato’s   philosophy   was   a   way   of   life,   and   the  
dialogues can help us identify features of this way of life. Once more, this merely shifts 
the problem of interpretation from a supposed implicit theory to a supposed implicit 
praxis or way of life. Three problems arise here. First, which practices matter most and 
why? Second, what are these practices, in a concrete sense? If  the  members  of  Plato’s  
Academy practiced memory exercises and routinely argued in a specific manner, it is 
hardly clear why this is supposed to be the ultimate point of the dialogues. Finally, Leo 
Strauss has pointed out, in the course of arguing for a version of the Ethical Theory 
interpretation, that there can be no Socratic way of life that we may emulate because we 
seem  to  lack  a  fundamental  feature  of  Socrates’  life,  namely  his  daimonion.39  
Foucault (2011: 121-155) offered a reading of the Laches that is indebted to 
Hadot’s   interpretation. He sees in the Laches three prominent practices of Socratic 
philosophy: speaking the truth (parrhēsia), examining and testing the soul (exetasis), 
                                                 
39 The  point  of  the  dialogues,  according  to  Strauss  (51)  is:  “live  as  Socrates  tells  you  to  live;;  live  
as  Socrates  teaches  you  to  live.”  In:  The City and Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1978). 
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 and care of the self (epimeleia heauton). Instead of a portrayal of the care of the self as a 
care for the soul (and an attendant ethics of purification), in the Laches Foucault sees 
the care of the self portrayed as a test of life, as a putting oneself and others to a test that 
will reveal their relation to the truth and how that relation may need to be adjusted – 
how  one’s  way  of   life  may  need   to  be   changed   in  order   to  become  able   to   speak   the  
truth and act in accordance with it. Here the aim of philosophy is not merely to 
understand the truth but to live it, to make a practice of living in a way that is 
characterized   by   speaking   the   truth   and   acting   in   harmony   with   one’s   own   words. 
Speaking frankly is a Socratic practice in which the socially prevalent use of 
manipulative rhetoric and flattery is suspended so that philosophical discourse may take 
its place. Thus, according to Foucault, the two old men (Lysimachus and Melisias) have 
set things up so that parrhēsia can prevail in their conversation, in order to have a 
chance to find a genuine answer to their question. They need those who know about 
courage honestly to tell them if the display of fancy fighting that they have just seen is 
the sort of thing that can help their sons care for themselves properly so that the latter 
will bring honor to their family and city. Foucault   also   reads  Nicias’  warning   to   the  
party (187e-188c) as an apt characterization of the Socratic practice of examination. 
According to Nicias, Socrates questions a person in such a way as to force them to give 
an account of themselves and the way they are living and have lived. Socrates invites 
his  interlocutor  to  explain  himself,  “to  show  the  relationship  between  himself  and  logos 
(reason)”   (2011:   144). In other words, those who are subject to philosophical 
examination must show that the words that they speak in a discussion, the reasons that 
they give in an argument, have the right relationship with their way of life, with the 
actions they choose. The main question is then whether one is living properly, not 
whether one has made pleasant conversation or been a persuasive speaker. This is what 
philosophical truth-telling aims to uncover and lay bare. The language Nicias uses to 
describe Socrates – as   someone  who   “puts   to   a   test”   (βασανίσῃ,   186   a3)   himself   and  
others — evokes the image of a touchstone, that is, a stone used to test precious metals 
to see if they were genuine. Socrates himself and his philosophical practice, his way of 
conducting philosophical inquiry in dialogue with others, is a sort of touchstone by 
which the accounts which others give are tested and it is discovered whether they are 
genuine, whether they are valuable (like gold) or not. What passes the test is approved 
as suitable for living well, what fails the test is rejected. As (Foucault 2011: 145-146) 
points out, the test is not something which happens when one is young and in school but 
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 is instead something which recurs throughout life; one must always be ready for re-
examination and re-assessment. We   see   this   theme   of   ‘late-learning’   played   out  
frequently in Plato, of education as a process that one undergoes throughout life. In an 
unsettling  way,  Socrates’  negative  critical  scrutiny  uncovers  philosophical  ignorance,  a  
scrutiny that all claims to knowledge and wisdom must be tested against. He is thus not 
the sort of teacher who passes on positive doctrine to students. 
Foucault  reads  the  aporetic  ending  as  suggesting  three  results:  First,  Laches’  and  
Nicias’  failure  to  accept  their  respective  refutations  is  a  good  sign  and  entails  that  they  
will seek to remedy their flawed understandings of courage.40 Next, Socrates over the 
course of the conversation has been identified as the one most worthy of trust, the one to 
lead the others toward knowledge of courage – even if he does not know it himself, he is 
best equipped to help them find someone who does. Finally, Socrates suggests that since 
none of them have shown that they know what courage is, and since he does not claim 
to be a teacher with knowledge to share, what is needed is for them all to look for a 
teacher who can help them. Foucault says that we should not read this as a literal 
request by Socrates, as though he thought there was actually some person in Athens 
who  could  tell  them  truly  what  courage  is,  but  rather  “This  teacher…is  of  course   logos 
itself, the discourse which will  give  access  to  the  truth”  (2011:  151).  
 Gonzalez proposes a third version of the Praxis Interpretation. Like Friedländer, 
he claims that Socrates exhibits the virtue of courage by his conduct in the dialogue 
(1998: 37). But Gonzalez does not claim that the definition of courage is ineffable. 
Unlike Laches, Socrates is skilled in the use of argument in the search for truth and 
capable of looking "beyond experience" (1998: 37). Unlike his two interlocutors, 
Laches and Nicias, Socrates does not overconfidently take himself to have the ability to 
argue  for  a  correct  definition  of  courage.  Socrates’  superiority  over  his  two  interlocutors  
is tied to his professed ignorance, because of which he never assumes based either on 
his experience or his reasoning ability that he knows anything with certainty. He has "a 
knowledge which is compatible with ignorance and is not a techne" (1998: 38). 
Gonzalez interprets Socrates as demonstrating courage in the dialogue rather than 
successfully defining it. On this reading, courage cannot consist of a moral knowledge 
of what is good and bad that would eliminate all risks or dangers of uncertainty, since 
                                                 
40 We take it that Plato expected his readers to know both the failure of the two generals to adopt 
a life of Socratic philosophizing and their consequent downfalls. Accordingly, any remedial 
efforts they might have made, as Foucault postulates, must have been unsuccessful.  
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 such a knowledge would be open to the same counter-examples Socrates employs with 
Laches (1998: 39). Courage must be a different kind of knowledge than technai. Unlike 
technai, courage is compatible with some degree of ignorance. If we had a science of 
good and bad that allowed us to undertake an action with complete certainty that we 
were doing the right thing or complete mastery of a skill that reduced all risk, courage 
would be impossible (1998: 40). Courage has to do with both moral and physical risks, 
with not being sure of what value in a given instance has priority, with facing the 
unexpected (1998: 40). Gonzalez reads the dialogue as deliberately not saying what 
courage is but rather showing what it is, in the life of Socratic "knowing ignorance" 
(1998: 40). This Knowing Ignorance Interpretation denies that the aim of a Socratic 
conversation like the Laches is to develop a theoretical account of virtue. Yet there is 
still a sense in which it takes the virtuous life to be a life not merely of intellectual 
activity but even of academic discussion, namely, a life of philosophical cross-
examination.  
Finally, we take Hildebrandt’s   Will to Power Interpretation (1933) to be a 
version   of   the   Praxis   Interpretation.   Hildebrandt’s   interpretation   is   voluntarist,   not  
intellectual. He denies not only that Socrates aims to develop any theory in 
conversations such as the Laches, but also denies that Socrates there is primarily 
concerned with any intellectual achievement, whether theoretical or non-theoretical. 
Like   Friedländer,  Hildebrandt   takes  Plato’s   ultimate   concern   to   be   political   reform   in  
the state. He thinks it is a fundamental mistake to see Plato as intellectually seeking to 
grasp  the  logical  structure  of  the  world,  as  one  “who  disengages  from  space  and  time  to  
establish an abstract,   eternal   system”   (1933:   13). Instead he interprets the early 
dialogues   as   reflecting  Plato’s   struggle for political power in Athens, writing them in 
order  “to  gather,  in  the  space  of  a  few  years,  followers  that  would  renew  the  state”  and  
become co-regents with Plato (1933: 105). 
In the Laches, Plato portrays two men of war, Laches and Nicias. Hildebrandt 
(1933: 92) takes Laches to represent the proper nature for a good soldier, and Nicias to 
represent  an   incompetent  and  unsatisfactory  nature.  Laches  “sees   in  Socrates   the  stuff  
that always is operative in the history of spirit, and he sees in the sophist the beautiful 
appearance   that   a   real   man   stands   against”   (1933:   87).   Laches   has   “courage   in   his  
blood”  not  his  intellect;;  he  has  “what  it  takes  to  be  a  true  student  of  Plato”  (Anlagen des 
echten Platonschülers,  1933:  90).  Nicias   lacks  “creative  blood”, and unlike Laches he 
does not recognize that Socrates is the true educator and nation builder. Nicias wrongly 
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 believes  “that  we  come  to  excellence  and  wisdom  through  merely  intellectual  learning”  
(1933: 88).  
Hildebrandt thinks the usual scholarly classification of Nicias as a Socratic on 
the  basis  of  his  dialectical  skills  is  a  mistake:  Nicias’s  words  are  “a  pseudo-intellectual 
surface”  (1933:  87).  Nicias  does  not  understand  the  statement  that  virtue is knowledge 
“in  a  Platonic  sense”  (1933:  88).  Laches,  in  contrast,  understands  Plato’s  “favorite  idea”  
(Lieblingsgedanke),   the   “harmony   of  word   and   deed”   (1933:   87).  A   powerful   ruler’s  
words of authority, the expression of will not intellect, are what has creative power in 
the world. 
The plausibility of Hildebrandt’s   reading   depends   upon   his   thesis   that   Plato  
approves of Laches and disapproves of Nicias. Scholars tend to be sympathetic to the 
idea, taken up by Hildebrandt, that Plato indeed does rebuke Nicias at Laches 198e-
199a.  There  Socrates  says  that  “in  war  the general is the best judge of what will happen, 
taking   heed   not   even   of   seers.”   As   Thucydides   relates   (7.50.4),   Nicias   as   a   general  
deferred to seers with disastrous results. However, as Fröhlich (2007: 197) points out, 
Socrates just as plainly rebukes Laches  at  197e.  There,  after  Laches  dismisses  Nicias’s  
distinction  between  fearlessness  and  courage  as  sophistry,  Socrates  says  “Nicias  seems  
worthy   of   consideration”   and   that   “whoever  wishes   to   grasp   the   greatest   things  must  
have a share in the greatest intellect.”  Again,  as  Fröhlich   (2007:  197) also points out, 
there  is  no  more  evidence  that  Laches’  approved  “harmony  of  word  and  deed”  is  Plato’s  
favorite idea than ideas expressed by Nicias, for instance, that courage is knowledge of 
what is and is not to be feared or that a man is good insofar as he is wise. Finally, it is 
worth   noting   as   well   that   while   Laches   may   approve   of   the   “harmony   of   word   and  
deed”, when refuted he admits to Socrates his failure to achieve it. If Laches is supposed 
to represent an endorsement of the importance of harmonizing word and deed, 
Hildebrandt needs to explain why Plato represents him as failing to harmonize his own 
words and deeds. 
We  agree  with  Fröhlich’s  assessment  (2007:  198):  “If  Hildebrandt  cannot  prove  
that Plato assesses Nicias as unfit and prefers Laches, then he is subject to the suspicion 
that it is his own anti-intellectual prejudice that discounts Nicias, promotes Laches, and 
projects these judgments  onto  Plato.”  As  Fröhlich  (2007:  205-8) shows,  Hildebrandt’s  
interpretation is more accurately attributed to Callicles and Thrasymachus than to 
Socrates  and  Plato:  “Plato  is,  according  to  such  an  interpretation,  nothing  but  a  tyrant”  
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 (2007:   208).   It   is   no   wonder   that   scholars   have   largely   ignored   Hildebrandt’s   anti-
intellectual  interpretation  of  Plato  since  Hitler’s  defeat  in  1945. 
The Unwritten Doctrines Interpretation 
 
Aristotle tells us (Physics 209b) that Plato orally taught some doctrines without 
writing them down. According to the Unwritten Doctrines Interpretation, the  “very  heart  
of Platonic ontology”, is composed of certain  “principles  of  doctrine  whose  application  
consists  in  the  reduction  of  all  types  and  relationships  of  beings  to  a  few  simple  entities”  
(Krämer 1959: 455).41 As Fröhlich (2007: 233) describes   it,   “in   the   logical   and  
mathematical investigations of the inner academy [ . . . ] all entities — sensory 
appearances, mathematical objects, the Forms — are reduced to two opposing 
principles, and their interactions in the different realms of reality are systematically 
apprehended  through  proofs  of  analogous  structures  and  laws  of  being.”  The  resulting,  
unwritten ontology is, according to Krämer (1972: 442 n. 112),  “the  core  and  summit  of  
Platonic  dialectic,  indeed,  of  Platonic  education  overall.”   
Krämer’s   (1959:   477) distinctive   proposal   was   that   “previous   research   was  
wrong  in  ascribing  the  ontology  of  principles  only  to  late  Plato.”  Krämer  ascribes  to  the  
Socratic  dialogues   three   functions:   (i)   to   attract   talented   students   to  Plato’s  Academy,  
(ii) to earn the respect of the untalented, and (iii) to remind insiders of the oral teachings 
by reference and hints. 
The Unwritten Doctrines Interpretation explains the negative ending of each 
virtue  dialogue  as  follows:  “the  appropriate  philosophical  basis, especially the solution 
of the problem of the apparent ambivalence and relativity of value, is certainly beyond 
the  written  dialogues  in   the  esoteric  realm  of  speculation  about  ontological  principles”  
(Gaiser 1959: 107). In the case of the Laches, Gaiser (1961: xv) takes the reference to 
‘going  back  to  school’  at   the  end  of  the  dialogue  as  further  evidence  that   the  dialogue  
points   “beyond   itself   to  a  higher  knowledge”, a knowledge reserved by Plato for oral 
instruction only in his school. The virtue dialogues  are  meant  to  convey  “that  we  must  
first   learn   the   crucially   important   [but   unwritten]   knowledge”   taught   in   the  Academy  
(Gaiser 1959: 116). 
                                                 
41 Other proponents include Gaiser 1959, “Das  Platon-Bild Stenzels und seine wissenschaftliche 
Bedeutung”, in Stenzel 1961; Platons ungeschriebene Lehre (Stuttgart: Klett, 1963); Thomas 
Szlezák, Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1985); and Erler 
1987. 
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 Erler (1987: 60) adds that the virtue dialogues serve the additional role of 
“memory  aid  for  those  coming  to  know” — that is, for students hearing oral instruction 
in  the  Academy.  He  proposes  that,  “whenever  the  discussion  leads  to  aporia  or  paradox,  
the cause is not in the logos itself,  but  is  seen  in  the  understanding  of  the  interlocutor”  
(1987: 277). The typical mistake of the interlocutor is to fail to understand properly true 
statements,   interpreting   them   in   a   false,   “this-worldly,   technical”  way  as   belonging   to  
the  “world  of  becoming”  (1987:  278).   
Like the Ethical Theory and the Theory of Knowledge Interpretations, the 
Unwritten  Doctrines  Interpretation  sees  Socrates’  goal  within  the  dialogue  as  a  theory—
ultimately metaphysical instead of ethical or epistemological. Thus Gaiser (1959: 228): 
“I  see  proper  Platonic  philosophy  in  the  first  place  as  converting  people  to the Form of 
the Good and thereby joining them to the Divine. The knowledge of virtue consists in 
the ability to view the principles and norms that are grounded in ontology—this is the 
aim  of  Plato’s  protreptic,  logical  philosophy” — that is, the virtue dialogues such as the 
Laches. Unlike competing Theory interpretations, the Unwritten Doctrines 
Interpretation is able to give a satisfactory account of the negative ending of a Socratic 
dialogue. As Wieland (1982: 44-5) puts  it,  “in  the  dialogues  those  [solutions] are never 
revealed, by which we might directly view, as such, the philosophical theory proposed 
by  Plato.  Once  we  are  aware  of   it,   it   is  natural   to  seek  Plato’s  philosophical   theory   in  
another place, for example in his unwritten teachings”. 
There are two main problems with the Unwritten Doctrines Interpretation. In the 
first place, as Fröhlich (2007: 234) puts   it,  “difficulty  with  sources  makes  problematic  
the reconstruction of Platonic esoteric — indeed unwritten — doctrines.”  What   this  
means is that even if Plato did have an esoteric doctrine and even if the dialogues are 
only the first step of an educational process that culminates in such a doctrine, in the 
absence of more reliable evidence regarding that doctrine, we can merely conjecture 
about it based on what others, with various agendas and axes to grind or at various 
historical   removes   from   the   Academy   in   Plato’s   time,   have   written. Moreover, we 
trivialize the explicit content of the dialogues we have for the sake of principles, 
imputed to Plato, concerning which we can only conjecture as to how he would have 
treated them himself. A few abstract principles or an intellectual vision of these 
principles or the ontological entities upon which they are based, or a method that leads 
students to such mystical insight—all these pale in comparison with what the dialogues 
explicitly provide us. As Wieland (1982: 43) says,   “The   two   sides   of   any   dialogue  
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 contain in any case far more philosophical substance than anyone has been able to 
reconstruct as communicable content of the unwritten teachings”. In the second place, 
no bare principle, or handful of principles, will save our lives in the manner Socrates 
seeks. What we need, rather, is practical expertise at human well-being, analogous to 
say, the craft of medicine in improving our souls, or to the craft of navigation in guiding 
us best through life. How would such principles, or a vision that catches sight of the 
ontologically primordial entities from which they derive, provide practical human 
expertise at living well in the Socratic sense? Having such a vision that grants one the 
'truth' for all time as something now permanently possessed is at odds with the practical 
life of self-examination and cross-examination of others that is represented in the figure 
of Socrates, who rather suggests that we do not yet know what we need to, that the truth 
is still out there for us to discover, that we remain on the way to it, hunting it and 
chasing it down, and are anything but mystical epopts whose ignorance has been 
replaced with a kind of revealed knowledge. 
The Philosophical Interpretation 
 
The   Philosophical   Interpretation   takes   at   face   value   Socrates’   account   in   the  
Apology of his life of cross-examination of others. The goal of a Socratic dialogue is to 
save a life from the guilt of reckless negligence by changing it from bad to neither good 
nor bad.42 According to this interpretation, Socrates is not trying to develop a theory—
be it ethical, epistemological, or metaphysical. Nor is he trying to develop non-
theoretical know-how or give us a vision of the Form of the Good. His goal is to change 
non-philosophers  into  philosophers,  by  removing  the  interlocutor’s  pretence of wisdom 
about the only thing of real value, human well-being. Even if the philosophical life 
never acquires wisdom, it is not fruitless. This is because, unlike the non-philosopher, 
the philosopher lives free from guilt. 
Socrates realizes, both on the authority of the oracle and on the basis of his own 
examination of three classes of men — politicians, poets, and craftworkers — that no 
human being, but only a god, might possess the highest level of wisdom, namely 
expertise at producing human well-being (23a). Yet the philosophically examining life 
at the middle level is worth living, while, as Socrates says, a non-philosophical or non-
                                                 
42 On the distinction between good, bad, and neither good nor bad, see Reshotko 2006 and 
Rudebusch 2011. 
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 examining life at the lowest level is not (38a). The difference between the middle and 
lowest levels is that philosophers recognize their own ignorance, while non-
philosophers do not. [reference removed] proposes that the fatal flaw of the lowest 
level, the non-examining  life,  is  its  guilt:  as  Socrates  says,  “this  ignorance,  which  thinks  
that   it   knows   what   it   does   not,   must   surely   be   culpable”   (ἐπονείδιστος,   29b2).   Thus  
whenever  Socrates  discovers  a  pretender  who  “does  not  possess  excellence but says he 
does”  (29e5-30a1),  Socrates  finds  him  worthy  of  “blame”  (ὀνειδιῶ,  30a1)  and  makes  it  
his goal to make the other aware of the ignorance and so to convert him to the life of a 
philosopher.  
How can the philosopher, at the middle level, be free of guilt (neither good nor 
bad) and the non-philosopher, at the lowest level, be guilty (bad), when both are alike 
ignorant of how to live well as human beings? Rudebusch (2009: 23-24), using 
homicide as an example, distinguishes the relevant levels of guilt. The highest two 
levels of guilt accrue to voluntary wrongdoing: premeditated murder and murder 
committed on the spur of the moment, as a crime of passion. While these two levels are 
established legal distinctions, Socrates denies that they have any moral application to 
human  beings,  since  “no  one  willingly  does  wrong”  (Gorgias 509e). Rudebusch defends 
Socrates’  denial  on  the  authority  of   the  oracle:  we  all   lack  the  expertise  to   judge  even  
whether to live or die is a harm or benefit. Indeed Socrates  finds  “culpable”  those  who  
think they know that death is something bad, in the passage quoted above (29b). Yet 
there remains a distinction between two kinds of involuntary wrongdoing, between for 
example homicide as a result of negligence or recklessness, which of course is culpable, 
and accidental homicide, which is guilt free. As Rudebusch (2009: 26) points out, it is 
reckless   negligence   that   Socrates   accuses  Meletus   of,   “saying  Meletus   is   unrighteous  
because  he  ‘treats  serious  matters  frivolously’  (24c5–6).”  Meletus,  as  we  might  say,  is  
playing with fire or going off half-cocked. Indeed, as Rudebusch (2009: 27) says, 
anytime Socrates finds a pretender to knowledge — that is, a non-philosopher — he 
imputes guilt to him. Socrates  “will  blame  him  for  scorning the things that are of most 
importance  and  caring  more  for  what  is  of  less  worth”  (30a1–2).  
That the unrighteousness of such scorn and misguided care is involuntary does 
not free the pretender from guilt [ . . . ] Socrates’   accusers   do   not   intend   to act 
unrighteously.  Yet  Socrates  warns  that  they  ought  to  beware,  because  “the  real  difficulty  
is to escape the condition of being wicked, which is quicker than death [ . . . ] My 
accusers, who are clever and quick, have been overtaken by the faster, by wickedness 
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 [ . . . ] they  will  go  away  convicted  by   truth  herself  of  depravity  and  unrighteousness”  
(39a7–b6). Simply not intending to act unrighteously is not enough, then. Rather, one 
must   in   addition   do   everything   in   one’s   power   to   ensure   that   one   does   not act 
unrighteously, so that even if one unwittingly is responsible for harm to oneself or 
others, one will not be culpable because every precaution has been taken.  
To explain the guilt Socrates has in mind, Rudebusch gives an analogy. The 
non-philosopher, undertaking all sorts of actions as a human being, bears the same type 
of guilt as a gunner shooting blindly or carelessly.  
The decision to raise a child, to make friends with another person, or to go to college – 
any of these choices might lead to disaster for oneself or others. Like such activities of 
human life, the use of firearms might lead to serious harm. Because of the risks, 
everyone  will  agree  that   if  I  don’t  know  how  to  use  firearms,  it  is  better  for  me  not  to  
use them at all than to play with them ignorantly (2009: 22).  
 
The philosopher by contrast, lives a guilt free life. By actively striving to find 
out how to act as virtuously as possible and not presuming falsely to already have 
figured this out, the philosopher avoids being recklessly negligent and any harm done to 
himself or others is nothing more than an unfortunate accident for which no one is to 
blame.  
 Like the Fruitlessness interpretation in either its Bitter or Think for Yourself 
version, the Philosophical Interpretation sees as Socrates’   goal   in   the   Laches to 
demonstrate to Laches and Nicias their ignorance. But the point of the demonstration is 
neither to show them their bitter fruitlessness nor to stimulate them to think for 
themselves. It is to lead them to a guilt free life. Rudebusch (2009: 28) gives the 
following reason to show that Socrates valued such a guilt-free life:  
Socrates says that he is free of guilt, even unintentional guilt, and knows that his guilt-
free condition is an even rarer achievement than that of an Olympic champion. This is 
why he proposes that the city provide him free meals in the Prytaneum, an honor 
reserved  for  champions  and  heroes,  on  the  grounds  that  he  “never  intentionally  wronged  
anyone”   (37a5),   an   achievement   that   he   also   describes   as   “never  wronging   any   one”  
(37b2-3). 
 
  If Socrates aims to free us of the guilt of living an unexamined life and 
recklessly endangering ourselves and others, we can explain the structure of the Laches 
and take away this moral: we must either reckon with our ignorance or risk ruining 
ourselves, our loved ones, and community.  
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While we no longer have Socrates around to goad us from out of our slumber, 
we are fortunate to still possess the Socratic dialogues authored by Plato. We began by 
posing the problematic situation for interpreting these dialogues and the wealth of 
conflicting views as to how one should read them. Our assessment of the alternatives 
leads us to endorse the Philosophical Interpretation. Alone among the alternatives, it 
does not impose a hidden, extraneous, or ideological significance upon the dialogue, nor 
violate the letter of the text in order to explain to us its spirit and meaning.  
Socrates intends to demonstrate that his partners in conversation are mere 
pretenders to knowledge and seeks to convert them to a life spent in search of wisdom, a 
life that is free of guilt, unlike that of non-philosophers. It is only through such a life 
that we escape the unwitting guilt characteristic of the life we lead before such 
conversion, that of not knowing that we do not know and yet acting as though we do, a 
form  of  hubris  that  in  Plato’s  presentation  of  the  Socratic  mission  provokes  not  divine  
nemesis but rather an all-too-human poetic justice, a case of being undone by our own 
‘blind  spot’,  as  Nicias  is  undone  by  his  over-reverence in Sicily and Laches at Mantinea 
by his inability to distinguish the wisdom that should accompany courage as anything 
other than prudential calculation, which latter he cannot accept since it eliminates the 
risks of the unknown that are a condition for displaying courage in the first place. 
Laches then, must obstinately ensure that he runs risks where he need not, in order to be 
courageous, and in practice this amounts to ceding to his own strategic advantage to his 
enemy and engendering thereby his own defeat. He would rather be a more courageous 
fool than a less courageous sound-minded victor in spite of his admission in the 
dialogue that courage, being a fine thing, cannot be foolish. Each   of   us,   too,   Plato’s  
Socrates would suggest, has just such a blind spot so long as we persist in the belief that 
we know more than that we are ignorant. Unless we, too, confront the depth of our 
ignorance we are just as much in danger as the two generals. 
 
 
George Rudebusch (Northern Arizona University) 
Chris Turner (DePaul University) 
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